

DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

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“Not man alone, all
rationals Heaven arms
With an illustrious, but
tremendous power,
To counteract its own most
gracious ends;
And this, of strict necessity,
not choice;
That power denied, men,
angels, were no more

But passive engines void of
praise or blame.
A nature rational implies
the power
of being blest, or wretched,
as we please.
Man falls by man, if finally
he falls;
And fall he must, who
learns from death alone,
The dreadful secret—That
he lives forever.” Young.

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DEDICATORY PREFACE.

To one whose aim is, to “serve his generation according to the Will of God,” but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming the attention of the public in the capacity of an author—the existence in the public mind of a want which needs to be met, and the full belief, that the Work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Under the influence of these two considerations,

the following Treatise is presented to the public. Whether the author has judged rightly or not, it is not for him to decide. The decision of that question is left with the public, to whom the Work is now presented. It is doubtful, whether any work, prepared with much thought and pains-taking, was ever published with the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was unworthy of public regard. The community, however, may differ from him entirely on the subject; and, as a consequence, a

approbation and counsel the work was prepared, the Author would take this occasion publicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important suggestions which he received from them, during the progress of its preparation.

Having said thus much, he would simply add, that, To the Lovers of Truth, the Work is now respectfully dedicated, with the kind regards of
THE AUTHOR.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.

The doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of theology, as well as of mental philosophy. This doctrine, to say the least, is one of the great central points, from which the various different and conflicting systems of theological, mental, and moral science, take their departure. To determine a man's sentiments in

TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY.

Such being the bearing of our present inquiries, an important question arises, to wit: What should be the influence of such considerations upon our investigations in this department of mental science It should not surely induce us, as appears to be true in the case of many divines and philosophers even, first to form our system of theology, and then, in the light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. The true science of

question. The mind has but one eye by which it can see itself, and that is the eye of consciousness. This, then, is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our inquiries in every department of mental science, and in none more exclusively than in that of the Will. We know very well, for example, that the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of Astronomy. What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his theory of optics by looking at the stars? This would be perfectly analogous to the

should the study of the Will be an exception?

The question now returns—what should be the bearing of the fact, that our theory of the Will, whether right or wrong, will have an important influence in determining our system of theology? This surely should be its influence. It should induce in us great care and caution in our investigations in this department of mental science. We are laying the foundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into the heart of man to conceive—

4. That he pursue his investigations with *implicit confidence in the distinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this subject*. Such a suggestion would appear truly singular, if made in respect to any other department of mental science but that of the Will. Here it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines been accustomed to look without, to determine the characteristics of phenomena which appear exclusively within, and which are revealed to the

must adopt, however, or there is at once an end of all real science, not only in respect to the Will, but to all other departments of the mind. Suppose an individual to commence a treatise on *colors*, for example, with a denial of the validity of all affirmations of the Intelligence through the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to treat. What would be thought of such a treatise? The moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties, in respect to the appropriate

consciousness, the only adequate witness in the case. The whole treatise, almost, consists of a series of syllogisms, linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms pertaining to an abstract something called Will. Throughout the whole, the facts of consciousness are never appealed to. In fact, in instances not a few, among writers of the same school, the right to make such an appeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give testimony in the case, has

distinguished author of *The Natural History of Enthusiasm*, in an Essay introductory to Edwards on the Will. "Even the reader," he says, "who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the form of a

department of mental science, which are not based upon the facts of consciousness.

PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED.

By what has been said, the reader will not understand me as denying the propriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the Bible. Though no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the

error into which we have fallen.

In conducting an investigation upon such principles, we shall, with almost absolute certainty, find ourselves in each domain, following rays of light, which will converge together in the true theory of the Will.

ERRORS OF METHOD.

Two errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have fallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now under

consideration, here demand a passing notice.

1. The two methods above referred to, the psychological and theological, which should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate, have unhappily been mingled together. Thus the subject has failed to receive a proper investigation in the domain, either of theology or of philosophy.

2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the same, *the wrong truth* has been adduced as the basis of such reasoning, to

wit: *the fact of the Divine foreknowledge.* As all events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in themselves, it is said, alike certain. This certainty necessitates the adoption of a particular theory of the Will. Now before we can draw any such conclusion from the truth before us, the following things pertaining to it we need to know with absolute certainty, things which God has not revealed, and which we never can know, until He has revealed them, to wit: *the mode, the nature, and the degree of*

the Divine foreknowledge. Suppose that God should impart to us apprehensions perfectly full and distinct, of the mode, nature and degree of His foreknowledge of human conduct. How do we know but that we should then see with the most perfect clearness, that this foreknowledge is just as consistent with the theory of the Will, denied by the philosophers and divines under consideration, as with that which they suppose necessarily to result from the Divine foreknowledge? This, then,

only an *indirect* bearing upon the subject.

2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, while of the mode, the degree, and the nature of the Divine foreknowledge we are profoundly ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of commands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit and demerit, and of reward and punishment grounded on moral desert, can never be more clear and distinct than they now are. From such truths, then, and not from those that we do not

understand, and which at the utmost have only an indirect bearing upon the subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at all, to the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scriptures. The reader is now put in possession of the *method* that will be pursued in the following treatise, and is consequently prepared to enter upon the investigation of the subject before us.

CHAPTER 2: CLASSIFICATION OF

THE MENTAL FACULTIES.

Every individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the operations of his own mind, cannot have failed to notice three classes of mental phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct from either of the others. These phenomena, which comprehend the entire operations of the mind, and which may be expressed by the terms *thinking*, *feeling*, and *willing*, clearly indicate in the mind three faculties

CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED.

1. The classes of phenomena, by which this tri-unity of the mental powers is indicated, differ from one another, not in *degree*, but in *kind*. Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all degrees, remains equally distinct, in its nature, from feelings and determinations of every class. So of feelings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the phenomena of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, remain, in their nature and

essential characteristics, equally distinct from thought on the one hand, and the action of the Will on the other. The same holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A resolution, for example, in one degree, is not a thought in another, a sensation, emotion, or desire and in another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In all degrees and modifications, the phenomena of the Will, in their nature and essential characteristics, remain equally distinct from the operations of the

Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility on the other.

2. This distinction is recognized by universal consciousness. When, for example, one speaks of *thinking* of any particular object, then of *desiring* it, and subsequently of *determining* to obtain the object, for the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind most clearly recognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations, and understand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental

facts indicate? They clearly show, that in the development of the universal Intelligence, the different classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly marked, and distinguished from one another, together with the three-fold division of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena.

4. The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are

qualifying terms in common use which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of the others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously applied to all classes of mental phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied to but one class. Thus we speak of *clear thoughts*, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of *irrepressible feelings and desires*, but never of irrepressible thoughts or resolutions. We also speak

of *inflexible determinations*, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, then, must universal consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations of the Will, as phenomena entirely distinct from one another—phenomena differing not in *degree*, but in *kind*, and as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental powers under consideration.

5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, so distinctly marked is it in

Chesterfield, speaking of a foreign minister, “you have a fair chance of imposing upon his *understanding*, and determining his Will.”

“*His Will*,” says another writer, speaking of the insane, “is no longer restrained by his *Judgment*, but driven madly on by his passions.”

**“When wit is overruled
by *Will*,
And Will is led by fond
Desire,
Then *Reason* may as
well be still,
As speaking, kindle
greater fire.”**

*[See Upham on the Will,
pp. 32-35.]*

In all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers, as consisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, is distinctly recognized. Yet the writers had, at the time, no particular theory of mental philosophy in contemplation. They speak of a distinction of the mental faculties which all understand and recognize as real, as soon as suggested to their minds. The above considerations are abundantly sufficient to

verify the three-fold distinction above made, of mental phenomena and powers. Two suggestions arise here which demand special attention.

1. To confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either of the others, as has been done by several philosophers of eminence, in respect to the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental science. If one faculty is confounded with another, the fundamental characteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same

the soul. All acts of the Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of the Will, and all acts of the Will are acts of the affections. All exercises of the Will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the soul's appetition or aversion; or which is the same thing, of its love or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more than another." "The Affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the Will." "The Affections are no

other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.”

Whether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena of the Will with those of the phenomena of the Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise.

CHAPTER 3: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

We come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the Will, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each of the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty.

SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.

Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as distinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as expressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a species of which Necessity expresses the genus. On

the other hand, they differ by way of *opposition*. All correct definitions of terms thus related, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually exclude each other that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality, be denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in their application. The terms *right* and *wrong*, for example, thus differ from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these terms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of an action that it is right, is

equivalent to an affirmation that it is not wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not right; 2d, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be either right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related.

The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one from the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations perfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between an *antecedent* and its *consequent*.

1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent *must* arise. This relation we designate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example, constituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in contact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is the consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation between the

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.

On the above definitions I
remark:

1. That they mutually
exclude each other. To
predicate Liberty of any
phenomenon is to affirm
that it is not necessary. To
predicate Necessity of it, is
equivalent to an
affirmation that it is not
free.

2. They are strictly and
absolutely universal in
their application. All
antecedents and
consequents, whatever the
nature of the subjects thus

the other of these relations. Either in connection with this antecedent, but this one consequent is possible, and this must arise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or more different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so: for possibility has, in reality, no degrees.

3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation of *consequents* to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under one or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation between

motives and acts of Will is that of *certainty*, still this certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent and its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined.

4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present investigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of philosophers. They are accustomed, in

SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WILL.

We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly but take place. If, on the other hand,

these phenomena fall under the relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents might have arisen in its stead.

Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this. The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above

omnipresent reality. To escape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

Such is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and particular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution of the argument upon the subject, we will—

I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of the Will are subject to the laws

apparently necessary connection with the premises.” The falsity of the doctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence.

2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no instance, real or supposable, have men any power whatever to will or to act differently from what they do. The connection between the determinations of the Will, and their consequents, external and internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will, for example, a

what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do differently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always sin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the Necessitarian cannot escape.

3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions together with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and their consequents was established by him. If that

relation be in all instances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole responsible antecedent of all consequents.

4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent propriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being deserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under circumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these could not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive him under obligation to

8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal retribution, probation based on such a principle?

9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical with

No man can show the want of perfect identity between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the origin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ at all.

10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of *man*, we must maintain, that the Will of *God* is subject to the same law. This is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining the necessity of all acts of the Divine

Will, the following conclusions force themselves upon us:

(1.) Motives which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will, are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not the first cause of anything.

(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will, we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of originating “all things visible and invisible,” belongs not to Him, but to motives.

is, an act is required of creatures, which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such a difficulty?

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY— DIRECT ARGUMENT.

II. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position, that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of Liberty, in

opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these relations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity for ever. A few

additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will.

1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty, as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will. This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations of the universal

Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of the truth of the doctrine.

2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to affirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our circumstances had been

different, we might have acted differently from what we did. A man, for example, says to himself—“At such a time, and in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct. I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I not?” These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in different circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular

consciousness. This testimony is given in three ways.

(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any change of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction.

(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these identical circumstances, either of

former are necessary, and the latter free that in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the latter may, be different from what they are.

5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation, merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in

nothing,” without a “local habitation or a name.”

On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one, he might, in the same identical circumstances, choose the other; infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and demerit, when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or punishment, when he does the one, or

course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and opposite course—what can be tyranny if this is not?

OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.

An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an appeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here

appeal to that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid, renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to examine it with great care. In reply, I remark,

1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will, it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the Intelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a test, by

five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is possible for us to affirm and believe

do fall under the relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration?

2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the propositions, Things equal to the same things are

equal to one another, There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and absolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter?

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN ALL MINDS.

III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of Liberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will *from the existence of the idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there found.*

which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed?

6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself to one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that this idea

as well as to those of the Will? Here, once again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary, while those of the Will are given as free.

THE DOCTRINE OF
LIBERTY, THE
DOCTRINE OF THE
BIBLE.

SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS.

We are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries.

NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.

I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they really hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circumstances of its occurrence, that one act

instances, the same, that of naked necessity.

4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as physical, or natural necessity. "Moral necessity may be," he says, "as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause."

5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of Will as that of *cause* and *effect*; and for this reason

being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists between volitions and external actions. “As external actions,” says President Day, “are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed by influence.” Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances, possible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act

THE TERM, CERTAINTY,
AS USED BY
NECESSITARIANS.

II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the words, *certainty, moral certainty, &c.*, as used by Necessitarians, are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined? The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all, but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the public seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in distinction

from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else? That it is, I argue,

1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not, according to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it

must, therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and nothing else.

2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not the former by the latter.

3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the influences, or motives,

under which particular acts are put forth. The Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked deformity.

III. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians, with very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do right or wrong, we can be under no

mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true exposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the influences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what they do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act differently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day has given a correct and definite answer. "The man who wills in a particular way, under the influence of

particular feelings, might will differently under a different influence.”

Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man, for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it. When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the

circumstances be changed, and then he might not sin. “In what sense,” asks President Day, “is it true, that a man has power to will the contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a *sufficient inducement*, he will make an opposite choice.” Is not this the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York, cannot but sin; placed in that of

cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner does not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no means. They constitute the very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be borne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the connection between the nature, or constitution of the sinner's mind—a nature which God has given him, and the influences under which he is placed by Divine

Providence—that none but these very inclinations are possible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations, sinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far as ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by throwing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally necessary?

NECESSARIAN
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.
The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme, next

1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from *Servitude*, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.

2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the language of a very distinguished philosopher, “if you cut off a man’s little finger, you thereby annihilate so much

certain corresponding
necessary consequents
external and internal,
therefore we are bound to
put forth given acts of Will,
whatever the influences
acting upon us may be, and
however impossible it may
be to put forth those acts
under those influences! Did
ever a greater absurdity
dance in the brain of a
philosopher or theologian?

5. The public are entirely
deceived by this definition,
and because they are
deceived as to the theory
intended by it, do they
admit it as true? Suppose
any man in the common

walks of life were asked what he means, when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a free agent at all. What men in general really mean when

difficulty remains in all its force.

2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circumstances, and not to place himself there again?

GROUND WHICH
NECESSITARIANS ARE
BOUND TO TAKE IN
RESPECT TO THE
DOCTRINE OF ABILITY.

DOCTRINE OF
NECESSITY, AS
REGARDED BY
NECESSITARIANS OF
DIFFERENT SCHOOLS.

VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one class, God produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and holy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine agency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and actions of every kind. With it, none but those which God produces can arise, and

these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others.

According to the other school, God does not, in all instances, produce volitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in creatures a certain nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to influences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they do put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large portion of this school, God,

common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth, that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but

theory which the universal Intelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one?

CHAPTER 4: EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL.

While it is maintained, that, in the sense defined in the preceding chapter, the Will is free, it is also affirmed that, in other respects, it is not free at all. It should be borne

receive or reject the offer, one or the other determination he *must* form. In the first respect, he is wholly free. In the latter, he is not free in any sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to all objects of choice presented to the mind. Motive necessitates the Will to act in some direction; while, in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it leaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations equally possible to the mind.

4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered

to the Sensibility. But while it follows either in distinction from the other, under the same identical influences, different and opposite determinations are equally possible. However the Will may be influenced, whether its determinations are in the direction of the strongest impulse, or opposed to it, it never, in deliberate moral determination, puts forth particular acts, because, that in these circumstances, no others are possible. In instances comparatively few, can we suppose that the mind,

direction in distinction from all others.

7. I now refer to one other fixed law under the influence of which the Will is always necessitated to act. It is the law of *habit*. Action in any one direction always generates a tendency to subsequent action in the same direction under similar influences. This tendency may be increased, till it becomes so strong as to render action in the same direction in all future time really, although contingently, certain. The certainty thus granted will

thoughtfully along the borders of “the undiscovered country,” his location in which he is determining by the habits of thought, feeling, and action, he is now generating.

STRONGEST MOTIVE— REASONING IN A CIRCLE.

A singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of Necessitarians, in respect to what they call the *strongest Motive*, demands a passing notice here. One of their main arguments in support of

always in the direction of this Motive, that is, it always follows the Motive it does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the law of Necessity. How many philosophers and theologians have become “rooted and grounded” in the belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this sophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, assumes the doctrine as true, and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth.

CHAPTER 5: THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD.

SECTION I.

We now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing upon our personal investigations—the proposition maintained by Necessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that *“the Will always is as the greatest apparent good.”*

PHRASE DEFINED.

The first inquiry which naturally arises here is

What is the proper meaning of this proposition?

In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things.

1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the dictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the Intelligence affirms to be best. Or,

2. That the determinations of the Will are always in conformity to the impulse of the Sensibility, that is, that its action is always in the direction of the strongest feeling. Or,

3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, and the impulse of the Sensibility combined, that is that the Will never acts at all, except when impelled by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the same direction.

MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS.

The following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning which Edwards attaches to the phrase, “the greatest apparent good.” “I have chosen,” he says, “rather to

preferring, &c., are therefore, according to Edwards, identical in their meaning. The proposition, "the Will is always as the greatest apparent good," really means nothing more nor less than this, that Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous argument based upon this proposition in favor of the doctrine of Necessity may be thus expressed. If the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, that is, if the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is governed by the law of Necessity. The Will is as

the greatest apparent good, that is, it always chooses as it chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By this very syllogism, multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of Necessity has been established with all the distinctness and force of demonstration.

The question now returns, Is “the Will always as the greatest apparent good,” in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined?

THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE.

I. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that all its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence. Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in opposition to the Intelligence? Has no intelligent being, whether sinful or holy, ever done that which his Intellect affirmed at the time, that he ought not to do, and that it was best for him not to do? I answer,

1. Every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows, that he has followed

I will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake. Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in all parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now when God determined to create the universe, he must have resolved to locate its centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At that moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence an infinite number of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither point

THE WILL NOT ALWAYS
AS THE STRONGEST
DESIRE.

II. Is the “Will always as the greatest apparent good” in this sense, that it is always as the strongest desire, or as the strongest impulse of the Sensibility? Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the Sensibility in opposition to the Intelligence? If this is not so, then—

1. It would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary acceptation

supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was in itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with all the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of one point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God's Sensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which none will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When, therefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the others, that

sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of such feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter, undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued.

THE WILL NOT ALWAYS
AS THE INTELLIGENCE
AND SENSIBILITY
COMBINED.

III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that its determinations are always

as the affirmations of the Intelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is not, I argue for two reasons.

1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and Sensibility are opposed to each other—a fact of very frequent occurrence,—there could be no acts of Will in either direction. The Will must remain in a state of absolute inaction, till these belligerent powers settle their differences, and unite in impelling the Will in some particular direction. But we know that the Will can, and often

does, act in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirmations of one and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each other.

2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as in the cases above cited, are alike indifferent, there can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts of Will whatever. Under these identical circumstances, however, the Will does act. The hypothesis, therefore, falls to the ground.

I conclude, then, that the proposition, “the Will is

because it must be. Sometimes it acts where the Sensibility and Intelligence both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also the Will acts in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is not necessitated to follow, in all instances, the highest affirmation, nor the strongest desire.

SEC. II—MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.

NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT.

I. We are now prepared to appreciate the

Necessitarian argument, based upon the assumption, that “the Will always is as the greatest apparent good.” This assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests. Yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a circle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his doctrine. His answer is, because “the Will *always* is as the greatest apparent good.” Cite now such facts as those stated above in contradiction of his

we find it, not in the motive, but in the power of willing itself.

OBJECTION— PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.

III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is asked, shall we account, on this theory, for *particular* volitions? The power to will only accounts for acts of Will in *some* direction, but not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be

impelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act, therefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection under consideration is consequently wholly baseless.

FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE
WRONGLY ACCOUNTED
FOR.

IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for acts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and felt to be perfectly equal,

requires attention. Suppose that A and B are before the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at all is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire equilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in distinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it is said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection instead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and

B, at all. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To determine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction from the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the Will towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains to be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it, by referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state of perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only by

falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the Will is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity.

CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL—HOW TREATED BY NECESSITARIANS.

V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit, choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a passing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the other, they say, in mental science. It is the height of

folly to appeal to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty and Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental science, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted receiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in the realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will

is possible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or of the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which, from the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in distinction from the other. In such circumstances, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these circumstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore is overthrown, and the truth

of that Liberty is demonstrated. So important are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True philosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon facts of any kind.

PALPABLE MISTAKE.

VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which Necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of the doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can and does select between objects

perceived and felt to be equal.

“The reason why some metaphysical writers,” says President Day, “have laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is probably the *inference* which they propose to draw from the position which they assume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or the other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly equal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all *other* cases, even though the motives to opposite

abandon their theory, or admit the dogma, of events without causes.

CHAPTER 6: CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

The argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the Divine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of the Will, however

remote in the distant future, are foreknown to God. This fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves certain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either God cannot foreknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument has already been anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience is not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the obvious reason, that of

the *mode, nature, and degree*, of the Divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we must know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any certainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the doctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How

do we know that these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we know but that, if we understood the *mode*, to say nothing of the nature and degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the utmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity.

If God foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they are not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary he foresees them. Having ascertained

by consciousness that the acts of the Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined, that God foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our mind, that God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such conduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter.

I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain acts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that

DANGER IN REASONING
FROM THE MANNER IN
WHICH WE FOREKNOW
EVENTS TO THAT OF
DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

“To begin, then, with a very
simple remark: if we
conceive that
foreknowledge in the
Divine Being acts as it does
in us, we run the risk of
forming a most incorrect
notion of it, and
consequently, of seeing a
contradiction between it
and liberty, that would
disappear altogether had
we a truer notion. Let us
consider that we have not

the same faculty for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in cases where we do anticipate it, it is by an induction from the past. This induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability. It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with necessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes in given circumstances having been determined by experience, we can predict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with

when the effects of free causes are to be anticipated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight must be merely conjecture.”

MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.

“If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of foresight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict consequence, that, as God must know exactly and completely the laws to which all the necessary causes in nature are

Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God. But yet can we not from analogy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of perception—of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we not imagine a third to exist in God—the faculty of perceiving the future, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This: that God, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human beings from the laws of the causes

Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right to assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that human reason should choose between them.”

SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.

There is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent reverence, upon the truth, that “secret things belong to God,” and those and those only, “that are

revealed to us;" that "none by searching can find out God;" that "as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His ways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;" and that it is the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand God's mode of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in

of the “secret things” which God has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of the *mode* of God’s fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire argument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once.

NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.

To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection which

reference to the mind of God, who knows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is certain.

CHAPTER 7: BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD, IN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT.

All truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must be, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of

Necessity be assumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of God's purposes and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other hand, we assume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a different view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the remarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall assume the truth of the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the light of

all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes and agency sustain to human action? In what sense does God purpose, preordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To this question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths before us. God purposes human action in this sense only: He determines himself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him to act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this, knowing

CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE ABOVE.

GODS PURPOSES
CONSISTENT WITH THE
LIBERTY OF
CREATURES.

1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God's purposes and agency with human liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do act, do not destroy their free agency,—a fact which must be true from the nature of the Will,—then God's purposes to give existence, and his agency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in

any sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident truth.

SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.

2. We also perceive the senses in which God purposed the existence of moral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the motives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would render themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But when we contemplate all the holiness and

and providence. The evil, God always regretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible with the existence of the best possible system.

DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.

3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which represent God as, on the whole, *purposing* the death of incorrigible transgressors, and yet as not *willing* it, but as willing the opposite. The purpose to destroy is

in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the death of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature to do, as affirming, that He is not “willing that any should perish, but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth.”

GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.

4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does that, and eternally purposed to

do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of his creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are in fault for such destruction. The reasons are these:

(1.) God never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor which did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently, and which was not best adapted to secure that end.

(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the *object* of God in creation and providence, the opposite of this being true.

(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.—Now if creatures perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault.

SIN A MYSTERY.

5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in which evil is chosen instead

which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite course.

CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.

One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of that government which results from this view of the subject commends itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe.

CHAPTER 8: OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

The Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the different departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following propositions:

1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable

only of the action of the Will.

2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon the Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that we are accountable. This I argue because,

1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circumstances of their occurrence, are not free,

involuntary states, opposed to it? This renders it demonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame are predicable only of the Will, or voluntary states of mind.

7. We will make another supposition; one, if possible, still more to the point. The tiger, we well know, has received from his Maker, either directly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most High, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame the animal for this nature? The answer, perhaps, would be,

power, are in perfect harmony with the moral law, and all the propensities are held in full subjection to that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in the discharge of his duty to God and Man. For the involuntary and necessary actings of those propensities, he cannot be responsible.

It is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their progenitors, propensities which impel and induce them to sin; but that, for the mere *existence* of these propensities, together with

their necessary involuntary action, they are not guilty.

SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY.

Certain dogmas in Theology connected with the subject above illustrated here claim our attention.

MEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS.

I. The first that I notice is the position, that creatures are now held responsible, even as “deserving God’s wrath and curse, not only in this life, but in that

has declared with an oath, that the “son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,” but that “every man shall die for his own sins?”

CONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT.

II. The next dogma deserving attention is the position, that mankind derive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature, which renders obedience to the commands of God impossible, and disobedience necessary, and that for the mere *existence* of this nature,

1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or even to conceive it to be true, that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency; for that which results, not from his own agency, but from that of another. The Intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions, than it can conceive of an event without a cause.

2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race. Present the proposition to any mind,

that, under the Divine government, the creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states of minds only, and such a principle “commends itself to every man’s conscience in the sight of God.” Present the dogma, on the other hand, that for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible, a nature which exists as the exclusive result of the agency of God himself, independently of the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, such creature is justly “bound over to the wrath of

God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal,” and there is not a conscience in the universe which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle. The intuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it.

3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature from which voluntary acts of a given character necessarily result, to talk of real *growth* or *confirmation* in holiness or sin, is to use

words without meaning. All that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, is to develop the nature already in existence. They can do nothing to confirm the soul in its tendencies, one way or the other. What should we think of the proposition, that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, when it commenced bearing, with the necessity of bearing this kind only, and with the absolute impossibility of bearing any other? So the soul, according to this dogma,

act, or by sustaining the laws of natural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not preventing the result of that act, and inducing a result precisely opposite, and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required of him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it. Is this a true exposition of the Government of God?

PRESENT
IMPOSSIBILITIES
REQUIRED.

III. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that

are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of God. In reply, I remark:

1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded on the express teachings of Inspiration, has not even the shadow of a foundation in any direct or implied affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the world to adduce a single passage of Holy Writ, that either directly or indirectly asserts any such thing.

2. This dogma is opposed not only to the *spirit*, but to the *letter* of the *law*. The law, addressing men, enfeebled as their powers

now are, in consequence of sin previously committed, requires them to love God with all their “mind and strength,” that is, not with the power they would have possessed, had they never sinned, but with the power they now actually possess. On what authority does any Theologian affirm, when the law expressly makes one demand upon men, that it, in reality, makes another, and different demand? In such an assertion, is he not wise, not only *above*, but *against* what is written?

3. This dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of Inspiration. The Scriptures expressly affirm, Rom. 13:8, that every one that exercises love, "hath fulfilled the law," hath done all that the law requires of him. This would not be true, did the law require a degree of love not now practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. 10: 12, it is positively affirmed, that God requires nothing of his creatures but to "love him with all the heart and with all the soul," that is, with all the powers they actually possess. This

hold the dogma under consideration do not practically believe it themselves.

The conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this: Holiness is a voluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation. Sin is a similar violation of such obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness. Nothing else is or can be sin.

CHAPTER 9: THE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF

VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND, OR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED.

In the remarks which I have to make in elucidation of this subject, I shall, on the authority of evidence already presented, take two positions for granted:

1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of Will.

2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated *Intentions*, and of course ultimate intentions, that obligation, merit and demerit, are predicable.

powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this, we then, it is affirmed, love God according to the letter and spirit of the above precept, “with all our heart, and with all our strength.”

SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD.

My object now is to show, that this last is the right exposition, and presents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and states of mind. This I argue from the following considerations.

1. If *intensity* be fixed upon as the standard, no one can define it, so as to tell us what he means. The command requiring us to love with *all* the heart, if understood as requiring a certain degree of intensity of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension of which our nature is susceptible. Or it may mean the highest possible degree, consistent with our existence in this body; or the highest degree consistent with the most perfect health; or some inconceivable indefinable degree, nobody knows

such a predicament as this, in respect to the most momentous of all questions, the determination of our true moral character and deserts?

3. While the standard under consideration is, and must be, unknown to us, it is perpetually varying, and never fixed. The degree of intensity of mental effort of which we are capable at one moment, differs from that which is possible to us at another. The same holds equally of that which is compatible with life and health. Can we believe that

“the judge of all the earth” requires us to conform, and holds us responsible for not conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where, and which is always movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed?

4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle, in reference to particular duties, will show clearly that it cannot be the standard of moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an individual becomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, that God

acting under the supreme control of the intention under consideration. If we adopt this principle, as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love with *all* the heart, perfect sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we adopt any other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law.

6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony with the intention under consideration, it is impossible for us to conceive, or affirm, that he has not done his entire

duty. What more ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish? Should it be said, that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of intensity, the reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and act, at all times, with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end to be accomplished. What more can properly or wisely be demanded? Is not this loving with all the heart?

7. On this principle, a much greater degree of intensity, and consequent energy of

action, will be secured, than on the other principle. Nothing tends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, than the attempt always to act with the greatest intensity. It is precisely like the attempt of some orators, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the greatest possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, let an individual throw his whole being under the control of the grand principle of doing all the good he can, and his powers will energize with the greatest freedom, intensity, and

effect. If, therefore, the standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed, Sincerity, and nothing else, is that standard.

8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the standard fixed in the Scriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, the Jews are accused of not “turning to the Lord with *the whole heart*, but feignedly,” that is, with insincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, according to this passage, have done it with the *whole heart*. The whole heart, then, according to

**CHAPTER 10:
INTUITIONS, OR
MORAL ACTS, NEVER
OF A MIXED
CHARACTER; THAT IS,
PARTLY RIGHT AND
PARTLY WRONG.**

We are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words, whether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or perfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or intuitions, in

the same time. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then another test is applied—that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least, it is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of intensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, pronounced defective. On the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be pronounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might possess a higher degree of intensity.

Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special attention. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose the same individual Will to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time." Does not the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and holiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious intention to obey

their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law; and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he adds, “The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent relatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil.” Then follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. “In like manner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good, while he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point good, then the moral law is his maxim

the heart, it positively prohibits everything short of this. The individual, therefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally sinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total disobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of ten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance required. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other determines not to

move at all. One has put forth an act of total disobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop short of loving with all the heart.

5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the existence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual who thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally in all degrees. The

obedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the reward of holiness and the “pleasures of sin”—a most selfish and wicked state surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention combining the elements of holiness and sin—is as great an absurdity as the supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any of its properties as a circle.

7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is contradicted by the express teachings of inspiration. “Whosoever

cometh after me,” says Christ, “and forsaketh not *all* that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.” The Bible knows men only as the disciples, or not disciples, of Christ. All who really comply with the condition above named are His disciples. All others, however near their compliance, are not His disciples, any more than those who have not conformed in any degree. If an individual has really conformed to this condition, he has surely done his entire duty. He has loved with all his heart.

“send forth both sweet water and bitter.” “Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.”

OBJECTIONS.

Two or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a passing notice here.

AN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES.

1. It is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great variety of motives at one and the same time. The same intention, therefore, may

be the result of different and opposite motives, and as a consequence, combine the elements of good and evil. In reply, I remark, that when the Will is in harmony with the Moral law, it respects the good and rejects the bad, alike in *all* the motives presented. The opposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law. The same regard or disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to reject the evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite choice, in respect to one motive, will induce

the same in respect to all other motives present at the same time. A mixed moral act can no more result from a combination of motives, than different and opposite motions can result in the same body at the same time, from forces acting upon it from different directions.

LOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME THAN ANOTHER.

2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our friends, and serving God, with greater strength and intensity at one time than

influences, cannot possess different degrees of intensity. The Will always yields, when it really does yield at all to moral obligation, with all the intensity it is, for the time being, capable of, or the nature of the case demands.

MOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER.

3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may become perfectly good and perfectly bad, for any indefinite number of instances, in any definite

condemnation “in the day of his transgression.”

**CHAPTER 11:
RELATION OF THE
WILL TO THE
INTELLIGENCE AND
SENSIBILITY, IN ALL
ACTS OR STATES,
MORALLY RIGHT OR
WRONG.**

The Will, sustaining the relation it does to the Intelligence and Sensibility, must yield itself to the control of one or the other of these departments of our nature. In all acts

moral obligation, instead of being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever. On the principle above illustrated, I remark:

THOSE WHO ARE OR
ARE NOT TRULY
VIRTUOUS, HOW
DISTINGUISHED.

1. That the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those who are not, now becomes apparent. It does not consist, in all instances, in the mere exterior *form* of action, but in the *spring* or *intention* from which all such action proceeds. In

in harmony with the universal law of duty, and all external action of a moral character proceeds from this internal, all-controlling intention. Here we find the broad and fundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those who are not.

SELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE.

2. We are also prepared to explain the real difference between *Selfishness* and *Benevolence*. The latter expresses and comprehends all the forms

strong influence of maternal affection, appears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now let this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty, so that she must violate the latter, or subject the former, and how soon will selfishness manifest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty! A gift is not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than natural affection uncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation. Men are just as selfish, that is, as perfectly subject to the law

of self-gratification, when under the influence of the social and amiable propensities, as when under that of the dissocial and malign, when, in both instances alike, impulse is the law of action. Moral agents were made, and are required to be, social and amiable, from higher principles than mere impulse.

COMMON MISTAKE.

3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear to have fallen, in judging of the moral character of

question needs to be determined, the *spring* from which such apparent virtues originate. They may arise from that regard to moral obligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they may be the result purely of excited Sensibility, which, in such instances happens to be in the direction of the forms of virtue.

DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE.

4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a passing notice here. Men

sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a consciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or more particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal disregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has its basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with great zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they rest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a regard to moral obligation,

with its specific applications, has its spring in some other department of their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire range of moral obligation.

SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE.

In preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that the Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will

other principles of the Moral law, and of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one common principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This principle has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different philosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that I notice is this.

It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived intrinsic and

principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will might become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are conscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us not to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that all Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same intention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on this point.

COMMON MISTAKE.

1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in treating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as consisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most distinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this proposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, that

are fully met in those feelings? Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If the demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the Sensibility—which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral agents, consists of right or wrong feelings—then all moral agents, at all times, and under all circumstances, are bound to have these same feelings. For what the law demands, at one time,

it demands at all times. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the theory under consideration.

LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW.

2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the *nature* of that *love* which is the “fulfilling of the law.” It does not, as all admit, consist in the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally obvious and universally admitted, in any mere *convictions* of the Intelligence. For reasons above assigned, it

fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent Chapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject presented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a necessary truth of the universal Intelligence.

IDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS.

3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral character, in all Intelligents of true moral rectitude. Their occupations, forms of

one and identical. In this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of character. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time, precisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control of the intention above illustrated, constitutes a perfect identity of character in God and all beings morally pure in existence. For this reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral agents

alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all obligation of every kind.

CHAPTER 12: THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.

SECTION I.

Every perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion, every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present

are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians, and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined to the action of the Will in the direction of the *natural propensities* and *religious affections*.

ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL PROPENSITIES.—

EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.

1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c., I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed

Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds true in regard to the action of all the

propensities. The excitement of the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire—a feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong.

ANGER, PRIDE,
AMBITION, &c.

Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere *feeling* of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or

RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.

2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex phenomena denominated *religious affections*. The position which I here assume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only on the ground that their

existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action of the Will.

SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.

My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance,

Love, and Faith. The question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such acts?

REPENTANCE.

In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used at all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases

was in a state of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular act was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration to the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that “we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” When, therefore, the Scriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of particular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the Sensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being and

the former will of course exist.

OF FAITH.

But little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is everywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous with *trust*, reposing confidence, committing our interests to God as to a “faithful Creator.” Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. “I know,” says Paul, “in whom I have believed,” that is, exercised faith, “that he is able to keep that which I have *committed* to him against

that day.” Here the act of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does not consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a voluntary act, *entrusting* our interests to God as to a faithful Creator. The principle above established must apply to all religious affections of every kind.

SEC. II. GENERAL
TOPICS SUGGESTED BY
THE TRUTH

ILLUSTRATED IN THE
PRECEDING SECTION.

Few truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the preceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of certain important questions which require elucidation.

CONVICTIONS,
FEELINGS AND
EXTERNAL ACTIONS—
WHY REQUIRED, OR
PROHIBITED.

1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of the Intelligence or Sensibility,

Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily result from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit the intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might specify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit the same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this disease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same thing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the intention which sustains to

the evil designed to be prevented, the relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in respect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and Sensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited.

OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA.

2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the existence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings.

FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL.

3. We now notice the *power of control* which the Will has over the feelings.

(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the control of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence.

(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent or unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will either greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example, when there is an

inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry feelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they appear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great extent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds true of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they are directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly modified, or totally disappear.

(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the

RELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT.

4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love, repentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their fundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will now, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different exercises to one another, especially the relation of *Faith* to other exercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been

implicit trust, or faith for “grace whereby we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear.” Now, such is our condition as sinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never purpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence of that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and perpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace; and but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been formed. In

consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all acts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself perfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally pure. This is the doctrine of

Moral Purification, or Sanctification by faith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than as a revealed truth of inspiration.

CHAPTER 13: INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS.

MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS.

It is an old maxim, that the Will governs the

judging particular cases, and thus incurring guilt. A question may very properly be asked here, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments, &c.? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they exclusively phenomena of the Will?

ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL.

The proposition which I lay down is this, *that the Intelligence, in its appropriate exercise, can seldom if ever, make*

wrong affirmations; that wrong opinions, admissions, pre-judgments, &c., are in most, if not all instances, nothing else than phenomena, or assumptions of Will. If the Intelligence can make wrong affirmations, it is important to determine in what department of its action such affirmations may be found.

PRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR.

Let us first contemplate the action of the *primary* intellectual faculties—

Sense, or the faculty of *external* perception; Consciousness, the faculty of *internal* observation; and Reason, the faculty which gives us *necessary* and *universal truths*. The two former faculties give us phenomena external and internal. The latter gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena, thus perceived and affirmed, to wit: the ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c. In the action of these faculties, surely, real error is impossible.

SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES.

Let us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties, the Understanding and Judgment. The former unites the elements given by the three primary faculties into *notions* of particular objects. The latter classifies these notions according to qualities perceived. Here, also, we find no place for wrong affirmations. The understanding can only combine the elements actually given by the primary faculties. The

Judgment can classify only according to qualities actually perceived. Thus I might go over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show, that seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can make wrong affirmations.

ERROR, WHERE
FOUND.—ASSUMPTION.

Where then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and pre-judgments? Let us suppose, that a number of individuals are observing some object at a distance from them. No qualities are given but those common to

a variety of objects, such as a man, horse, ox, &c. The perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case. It has given nothing but real qualities. The Understanding can only form a notion of it, as an object possessing these particular qualities. The Judgment can only affirm, that the qualities perceived are common to different classes of objects, and consequently, that no affirmations can be made as to what class the object perceived does belong. The Intelligence, therefore, makes no false

affirmations. Still the inquiry goes round. "What is it?" One answers, "It is a man." That is my opinion. Another: "It is a horse." That is my judgment. Another still says, "I differ from you all. It is an ox." That is my notion. Now, what are these opinions, judgments, and notions? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence? By no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, under such circumstances. They are nothing in reality, but mere *assumptions* of the Will. A vast majority of the so called opinions, beliefs,

assumptions, in reality known to be false.

2. Assumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing ourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our assumptions. For us to assume any proposition, or statement, to be true or false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, as the basis of such assumptions, when adequate light is available, involves the same criminality, as assumptions in opposition to the Intelligence. Hence we often have the

or the other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of the former. How often do flagrant transgressions of moral rectitude occur in such instances!

PRE-JUDGMENTS.

A few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. A pre-judgment is an assumption, that a proposition or statement is true or false, before the facts, bearing upon the case, have been heard. Such assumptions are generally classed under the term prejudice. Thus it is said of individuals, that

they are prejudiced in favor or against certain persons, sentiments, or causes. The real meaning of such statements is, that individuals have made assumptions in one direction or another, prior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and irrespective of such facts.

INTELLECT NOT
DECEIVED IN PRE-
JUDGMENTS.

It is commonly said, that such prejudices, or prejudgments, blind the mind to facts of one class, and render it quick to discern

not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the true bearing of the facts actually presented. In respect to those not presented, and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole case, it makes no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion from a partial hearing, that opinion is a mere assumption of Will, and nothing else.

THE MIND HOW
INFLUENCED BY PRE-
JUDGMENTS.

But the manner in which
pre-judgments chiefly

affect the mind in the hearing of a cause, still remains to be stated. In such pre-judgments, or assumptions, an assumption of this kind is almost invariably included, to wit: that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one side of the question, are wholly indecisive, while all others bearing upon the other side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individuals do not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, but the character of all the facts bearing upon it. They enter upon the investigation of a

given subject, with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts and arguments they shall meet with, according to previous assumptions. Let the clearest light poured upon one side of the question, and the reply is, "After all, I am not convinced," while the most trivial circumstances conceivable bearing upon the other side, will be seized upon as perfectly decisive. In all this, we do not meet with the operations of a deceived Intelligence, but of a "deceived heart," that is, of a depraved Will,

stubbornly bent upon
verifying its own
unauthorized, pre-formed
assumptions. Such
assumptions can withstand
any degree of evidence
whatever. The Intelligence
did not give them
existence, and it cannot
annihilate them. They are
exclusively creatures of
Will, and by an act of Will,
they must be dissolved, or
they will remain proof
against all the evidence
which the tide of time can
roll against them.

INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS.

The influences which induce false and unauthorized assumptions, are found in the strong action of the Sensibility, in the direction of the appetites, natural affections, and the different propensities, as the love of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of character, of opinion, &c. When the Will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a particular propensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, or assumption,

that action in that direction is wrong! The difficulty, in such cases, does not, in most instances, lie in convincing the Intelligence, but in inducing the Will to admit as true what the Intelligence really affirms.

CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE INTELLIGENCE.

As there are cases of this kind, it is important to mark some of their characteristics. Among these I cite the following:

The *Intelligence* in this case is not deceived. It places the Will, however, in such a relation to the object, that if a positive assumption is made, it must necessarily be a wrong one. In this manner, multitudes of wrong assumptions arise.

2. When facts are before the mind, an *explanation* of them is often desired. In such circumstances, the Intelligence may suggest, in explanation, a number of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike false. If a positive assumption is made in

any other object, and consequently, that the apple must have been present in the instance given. *Experience*, and not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence, led to the wrong assumption in this instance. The same principle holds true, in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named.

4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in the presence of qualities perceived, but it may affirm *hypothetically*, that is, when a given

as possessed of such characteristics, to the full subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized assumptions.

CHAPTER 14: LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.

LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE.

There are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to be carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it stands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to

accomplishment. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of moral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in servitude to any propensity whatever. He “rules his own spirit.” He is the master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He resolves against the evil, and avoids it. “Greater,” says the maxim of ancient wisdom, “is such a man than he that taketh a city.”

Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is *a state in which the Will is so ensnared by the*

Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the propensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with any rational expectation of keeping that resolution. The individual in this condition “knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the bad.” “The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the evil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does.” All men agree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude.

good in itself. Every man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important sense, against his Will. The *state* in which he is, is regarded as in itself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom.

The same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude. When any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising to full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime harmony

state the most abject, and least to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot but despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself. Yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and effort of self-emancipation. No term but Servitude, together with others of a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice—that is, from choice of the state as a good in itself. The *state* he regards as an evil

in itself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom.

REMARKS.

MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.

1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians, especially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and not as distinguished from

Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very little light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the foundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. “A free Will,” says Kant, “and a Will subjected to the Moral Law, are one and identical.” A more capital error in philosophy is not often met with than this.

MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.

2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms all men to be, until they are

To meet this great want of human nature; to provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the Scriptures, with great propriety, call the “bondage of corruption,” is a fundamental design of the Remedial System.

CHAPTER 15: LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE.

COMMON IMPRESSION.

A very common impression exists,—an impression universal among those who hold the doctrine of Necessity,—that the

Chapter, therefore, is to *elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the spirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and to induce the spirit of humility and dependence upon Divine Grace.*

SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED.

Before proceeding directly to argue this question, we need to settle definitely the meaning of the phrase *spirit of dependence*. The *conviction* of our dependence is one thing. The *spirit* of dependence is

altogether a superiority
over the doctrine of
Necessity?

DOCTRINE OF
NECESSITY TENDS NOT
TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT
OF DEPENDENCE.

1. In accomplishing my
object, I will first consider
the tendency, in this one
respect, of the doctrine of
Necessity. An individual,
we will suppose, finds
himself under influences
which induce him to sin,
and which consequently, if
this doctrine is true, render
it impossible for him,
without the interposition of

this *conviction*, but none to induce the *spirit* of dependence: inasmuch as with this conviction, it produces another equally strong, to wit: that the creature, without a Divine interposition, will not, and cannot, exercise the *spirit* of dependence. In thus producing the conviction, that, under present influences, the subject does not, and cannot exercise that spirit, this doctrine tends exclusively to the annihilation of that Spirit. When an individual is in a state of actual obedience, the tendency of this

doctrine upon him is no better; since it produces the conviction, that while a Divine influence, independently of ourselves, produces in us a spirit of dependence, we shall and must exercise it; and that while it does not produce that spirit, we do not and cannot exercise it. Where is the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in such a conviction? According to the doctrine of Necessity, nothing but the actual interposition of Divine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of dependence. The *belief*

and avoid, He will subject us to a Divine influence, which shall for ever secure us in the one, and against the other. The conviction, therefore, rises with full and perfect distinctness in the mind, that, in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, action in all future time, in the direction of purity and bliss, is secure; and that, in the absence of this spirit, action, in the opposite direction, is equally certain. In the belief of the doctrine of Liberty, another truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our

GOD CONTROLS ALL
INFLUENCES UNDER
WHICH CREATURES DO
ACT.

3. While the existence and continuance of our powers of moral agency depend wholly upon the Divine Will, and while the Most High knows, with entire certainty, in what direction we shall exert our powers, under all influences, and systems of influences, brought to bear upon us, all these influences are entirely at his disposal. What tendency have such convictions, together with the consciousness of

Liberty, and ability to exercise, or not to exercise, the spirit of dependence, but to induce us, in the exercise of that spirit, to throw our whole being into the petition, “Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil?” If God knows perfectly under what influences action in us shall be in the direction of the right, or the wrong, and holds all such influences at his own control, what attitude becomes us in the presence of the “High and lofty One,” but dependence and prayer?

DEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE WILL.

4. Finally, a consciousness of a state of Moral Servitude, together with the conviction, that in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, we can rise to the “Glorious Liberty of the Sons of God;” that in the absence of this spirit, our Moral Servitude is perfectly certain; all these, together with the conviction which the belief of the doctrine of Liberty induces (to wit: that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is

dependence which cries
“Abba, Father!”

CHAPTER 16: FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

ELEMENT OF WILL IN
FORMATION OF
CHARACTER.

CHARACTER
COMMONLY HOW
ACCOUNTED FOR.

In accounting for the
existence and formation of
peculiarities of character,
individual, social, and
national, two elements only
are commonly taken into

THE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE ACCOUNT.

In a vast majority of cases, however, another, and altogether a different element, that of the Will, or voluntary element, must be taken into the reckoning, or we shall find ourselves wholly unable to account for peculiarities of mental and moral development, everywhere visible around us. It is an old maxim, that “every man is the arbiter of his own destiny.” As character determines destiny, so the Will

exist. In a majority of instances, however, if the two elements under consideration, and these only, are taken into the account, we shall find our conclusions very wide from the truth.

AN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION.

I will take, in illustration of the above remarks, a single example—a case with which I became so familiarly acquainted, that I feel perfectly safe in vouching for the truth of the statements which I am about to make. I knew a

boy who, up to the age of ten or twelve years, was under the influence of a most ungovernable temper—a temper easily and quickly excited, and which, when excited, rendered him perfectly desperate. Seldom, if ever, was he known to yield in a conflict, however superior in strength his antagonist might be. Death was always deliberately preferred to submission. During this period, he often reflected upon his condition, and frequently wished that it was otherwise. Still, with melancholy deliberation,

he as often said to himself, I never can and never shall subdue this temper. At the close of this period, as he was reflecting upon the subject again, he made up his mind, with perfect fixedness of purpose, that, to the control of that temper, he would never more yield. The Will rose up in the majesty of its power, and assumed the reins of self-government, in the respect under consideration. From that moment, that temper almost never, even under the highest provocations, obtained the control of the

these two periods—by an exclusive reference to natural propensities and external influences. What a totally inadequate and false account should we give of the facts presented! That individual is just as conscious, that it was the element of Free Will that produced this revolution, and that when he formed the determination which resulted in that revolution, he might have determined differently, as he is, or ever has been, of any mental states whatever. All the facts, also, as they lie out before us, clearly indicate,

that if we leave out of the account the voluntary element, those facts must remain wholly unexplained, or a totally wrong explanation of them must be given.

The same principle holds true in all other instances.

Though natural propensities and external influences greatly *modify* mental developments, still, the *distinguishing* peculiarities of character, in all instances, receive their form and coloring from the action of the voluntary power. This is true, of the peculiarities of

character exhibited, not only by individuals, but communities and nations. We can never account for facts as they are, until we contemplate man, not only as possessed of Intelligence and Sensibility, but also of Free Will. All the powers and susceptibilities must be taken into the account, if men would know man as he is.

DIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER.

A few important definitions will close this Chapter.

A decisive character exists, where the Will acts in

harmony with propensities strongly developed. When a number of propensities of this kind exist, action, and consequently character, may be changeable, and yet decisive.

Unity and *decision* of character result, when the Will steadily acts in harmony with someone over-shadowing propensity.

Character is *fluctuating* and *changeable*, when the Will surrenders itself to the control of different propensities, each easily and highly excited in the presence of its appropriate

objects, and yet the excitement but temporary. Thus, different propensities, in rapid succession, take their turn in controlling the Will.

Indecision and *feebleness* of character result, when the Will uniformly acts under the influence of the principle of *fear* and *caution*. To such a mind, in all important enterprises especially, there is always “a lion in the way.” Such a mind, therefore, is continually in a state of distressing indecision when energetic action is necessary to success.

CHAPTER 17: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

A few reflections of a general nature will conclude this Treatise.

OBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS.

1. An objection, often adduced, to the entire view of the subject presented in this Treatise, demands a passing notice here. All things in existence, it is said, and the Will among the rest, are governed by

OBJECTION. GOD
DETHRONED FROM HIS
SUPREMACY, IF THE
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY
IS TRUE.

2. Another objection of a general nature, is the assumption, that the doctrine of Liberty destroys the Divine supremacy in the realm of mind. "If man," says Dr. Chalmers, "is not a necessary agent, God is a degraded sovereign." A sentiment more dishonorable to God, more fraught with fatal error, more revolting to a virtuous mind, when unperverted by a false

theory, could scarcely be uttered. Let us, for a moment, contemplate the question, whether the doctrine of Liberty admits a Divine government in the realm of mind. The existence and perpetuity, as stated in a former Chapter, of free and moral agency in creatures, depend wholly upon the Divine Will. With a perfect knowledge of the direction in which they will exert their powers, under every kind and degree of influence to which they may be subjected, He holds all these influences at his

crime, may find “quietness and assurance forever.”

OBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

3. In reply to what has been said in respect to the *tendencies* of the doctrine of Necessity, the fact will doubtless be adduced, that the greatest and best of men have held this doctrine, without a development of these tendencies in their experience. My answer is, that the goodness of such men, their sense of moral

obligation, &c., did not result from their theory, but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies. They held this doctrine in theory, and yet, from a *consciousness* of Liberty, they practically adopted the opposite doctrine. Here, we have the source of the deep feeling of obligation in their minds, while the intrinsic and exclusive tendency of their *Theory*, even in them, was to weaken and annihilate this hallowed feeling. The difference between such men and sceptics is this: The piety of the former

prevents their carrying out their theory to its legitimate results; while the impiety of the latter leads them to march boldly up to those results—a fearless denial of moral obligation in every form.

LAST RESORT.

4. The final resort of certain Necessitarians, who may feel themselves wholly unable to meet the arguments adduced against their own and in favor of the opposite theory, and are determined to remain fixed in their opinions, may be readily anticipated. It is

an assumption which may be expressed in language somewhat like the following: "After all, the immortal work of Edwards still lives, and will live, when those of his opponents will be lost in oblivion. That work still remains unanswered." A sweeping assumption is a very easy and summary way of disposing of a difficulty, which we might not otherwise know what to do with. Let us for a moment contemplate some of the facts which have been undeniably

established in reference to this immortal work.

(1.) At the outset, Edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in philosophy, an error which gives form and character to his whole work—the confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and thus confounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty with those of the phenomena of the latter.

(2.) His whole work is constructed without an appeal to Consciousness, the only proper and authoritative tribunal of

strongest. The evidence is, the *fact* of its action in that direction. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of Necessity. The proof is, the action of the Will in the direction of the Strongest Motive, that is, the Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage argument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theologians of the 19th century, as possessing the elements of immortality!

(5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be wholly based upon an *assumption* unauthorized by reason, or

the avowed authority of his Theory.

(7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of Necessity, with the single exception of that from the Divine Fore-knowledge—an argument resting, as we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless,—involve a begging of the question at issue. Take any argument we please, with this one exception, and it will be seen at once that it has no force at all, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it, be assumed as the basis of

that argument. Shall we pretend that a Theory, that has been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, the errors, absurdities, and contradictions above named, has not been answered?

WILLING, AND AIMING
TO PERFORM
IMPOSSIBILITIES.

5. We are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers have been somewhat divided in opinion—the question, whether the Will can act in the direction of perceived

and affirmed impossibilities? The true answer to this question, doubtless is, that the Mind may *will* the occurrence of a known impossibility, but it can never *aim* to produce such an occurrence.

The Mind, for example, while it regards the non-existence of God as that which cannot possibly occur, may come into such a relation to the Most High, that the *desire* shall arise that God were not. With this desire, the Will may concur, in the *wish*, that there were no God. Here the Mind wills a known

impossibility. In a similar manner, the Mind may will its own non-existence, while it regards its occurrence, on account of its relation to the Divine Will, as impossible.

But while the Mind may thus *will* the occurrence of an impossibility, it never can, nor will aim, that is, intend, to produce what it regards as an impossibility.

A creature may will the non-existence of God; but even a fallen Spirit, regarding the occurrence as an absolute impossibility, never did, nor will aim to annihilate the Most High.

To suppose the Will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded as impossible, involves a contradiction.

For the same reason, the Will will never set itself upon the accomplishment of that which it is perfectly assured it never shall accomplish, however sincere its efforts towards the result may be. All such results are, to the Mind, *practical* impossibilities. Extinguish totally in the Mind the *hope* of obtaining the Divine favor, and the Divine favor will never be sought. Produce in the

revealed. The same principle holds true in all other instances.

THOUGHT AT PARTING.

6. In taking leave of the reader, I would simply say, that if he has distinctly apprehended the great doctrine designed to be established in this Work, and has happily come to an agreement with the author in respect to it, the following hallowed impression has been left very distinctly upon his mind. While he finds himself in a state of profound and most

